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Historians know the crucial importance played by the boundary that sep-
arated the core of the Roman Empire from its periphery—a boundary
known as the Limes. In addition to being a line of military defense, it was a
locus of cross-inﬂuences. While the core contributed to shaping the “bar-
barous” lands located beyond its walls, the periphery shaped the inner ar-
eas, since protection from the dangers of military conﬂict involved provid-
ing for such outcomes. And for reasons that are hard to understand, the
long survival of this frontier extended long after the fall of the Roman Em-
pire: More than ten centuries after its collapse, the former Limes surpris-
ingly coincided with the line that separated Christians during the religious
wars, into Protestants and Roman Catholics.
In comparison with this very long-run phenomenon, the experience of
the international monetary system is that of a toddler. And yet the recent
turmoil in international ﬁnancial markets has forced economists and poli-
cymakers to come to grips with something similar. The recent discussions
on the exchange rate regimes that are advisable in order to cope with ﬁnan-
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Core, Periphery, Exchange Rate
Regimes, and Globalization
Michael D. Bordo and Marc Flandreaucial instability rest on the observation that the challenges of globalization
are not quite the same depending on whether we focus on developing coun-
tries and emerging markets or developed ones. Whereas the latter are free
to go their exchange rate way, the former are said to face the dilemma of ei-
ther anchoring themselves to core countries with extra strong glue, or re-
maining out of the Limes of modern integration with a volatile exchange
rate.
As a recent literature has argued, there is a certain “fear of ﬂoating”
among modern developing countries. But this is obviously nihil novi sub sole
for economic historians familiar with that other major experience of glob-
alization, namely that of the late nineteenth century. For then, already, there
was a core that followed the high road of more or less complete gold con-
vertibility, and an infamous periphery that had trouble pegging but re-
sented ﬂoating. And it is striking that the list of “peripheral” nations has
not changed that much over the course of the century: Today, like yesterday,
it includes Latin American countries, Central Europe, Russia, and to some
extent Asia—among the latter, Japan was already standing out as an ex-
ception.1
This persistence nonetheless conceals a profound transformation of the
international monetary system—a transformation that has occurred at the
core of the global exchange rate system. Today, ﬂexible exchange rates have
superseded, in advanced countries (with the notable exception of Europe)
the nineteenth-century system of ﬁxed exchange rates known as the gold
standard. In other words, “globalization” appears to mean surprisingly
consistent things in the periphery, but radically opposite things in the core.
This may in fact sound somewhat paradoxical: In the late nineteenth cen-
tury globalization was in the popular mind associated with the gold stan-
dard, and most academics concurred (Kemmerer 1916). Yet after the col-
lapse of the Bretton Woods system in the early 1970s the heart of the global
monetary system is based on ﬂoating exchange rates. How do we interpret
this? On the surface, this would seem to suggest that the exchange rate sys-
tem is quite irrelevant to the process of globalization: Nature ﬁnds its ways.
At the same time, how do we make sense of the serious concerns that aca-
demics and policymakers have over the problem of the appropriate ex-
change rate system for the emerging countries? Why should there be diﬀer-
ent recipes for the advanced and the emergers?
The theoretical literature pertaining to the links between integration and
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1. We use the distinction core versus periphery for the pre-1914 period following a well-
established tradition in economic history. For the recent period we use the terminology ad-
vanced versus emerging countries. The diﬀerence between the two demarcations is largely geo-
graphical (the core before 1914 meant Western Europe and after 1900 the United States,
whereas the periphery was everyone else). Today advanced countries are in every region. The
key unifying theme for both demarcations, as pointed out by our discussant Anna Schwartz,
is that (core) advanced countries are generally capital rich and the (periphery) emerging coun-
tries are generally capital poor.exchange rate regimes generally overlooks this problem. Two opposite
views may be identiﬁed. Both assume some kind of market imperfection,
because in a perfectly rational and frictionless world, ﬁxed and ﬂexible sys-
tems should deliver identical outcomes and the question of the links be-
tween exchange rate regimes and integration would be irrelevant (Helpman
1981).
The “transaction costs” view on the one hand assumes that ﬂoating ex-
change rates are a risk that cannot be diversiﬁed away and thus tantamount
to a distortion preventing full specialization. From this perspective a ﬁxed
exchange rate may deliver both a higher level of integration and superior
economic performance. This view is very old and originates in nineteenth-
century classical economics.
On the other hand, the “policy view” rests on the notion that, due to the
existence of nominal rigidities and factor immobility, ﬂexible exchange
rates might be advisable to smooth out the international adjustment pro-
cess: Exchange rate ﬂexibility, from this perspective, is not an enemy to in-
ternational integration. This view is traditionally associated with Robert
Mundell, and Padoa-Schioppa’s trilemma. It has been put to work by Barry
Eichengreen to explain the (according to the recent literature, partial) trend
toward ﬂuctuating exchange rates. The expansion of democracy, by calling
for an increase in income smoothing, has led more and more countries to
ﬂoat their way into globalization—again with the notable exception of Eu-
rope.
None of these views, however, takes seriously into account the dichotomy
between core and peripheral countries. And yet the quite distinct dynamics
of exchange rate regimes depending on whether we focus on the center or
on the periphery suggests that diﬀerent stories may have to be told for each.
At the same time, as the comparison with the Roman Empire suggests, the
record of the center cannot be understood without reference to the periph-
ery, and vice versa. Systems are tested on their margins.
In this paper we seek to provide an interpretation of both the presence of
“fear of ﬂoating” in the periphery and the transition to ﬂexible exchange
rates in the center. Our argument rests on the role of technological progress
in money and ﬁnance. In the nineteenth century, adherence to gold pro-
vided a stable environment that contributed to the development of deep and
liquid money markets. At the same time, gold convertibility was a con-
straint on monetary policies because it implied currency bands within
which core nations sought to obtain as much room to maneuver as they
could. By the 1970s, ﬁnancial maturity allowed the core countries to ﬂoat.
In a sense in the current ﬂoating regime countries, by learning to follow a
domestic nominal anchor, have been able to eliminate the credibility bands
of the classical gold standard, which in its time granted the core countries
only a modicum of the policy independence they have today.
By contrast to the core, many peripheral countries in the pre-1914 period
Core, Periphery, Exchange Rate Regimes, and Globalization 419lacked what we suggest calling the “ﬁnancial maturity” to successfully ad-
here to gold. The alternative of ﬂoating was fraught with danger because
they were forced to obtain the foreign capital crucial to their development
by borrowing in terms of sterling (or other core-country currencies) or else
having gold clauses.
In times of ﬁnancial crises, then as now, devaluations led to debt crises.
Thus, we argue that peripheral countries then, as now, were forced to adopt
super-hard ﬁxed exchange rates (currency boards or close to 100 percent
gold reserves then, currency boards or dollarization now) because they had
not developed the ﬁnancial maturity to ﬂoat, or else they had to restrict for-
eign borrowing. Thus, the link between globalization and the exchange rate
regime turns out to depend on ﬁnancial maturity:2 That is, “Tell us how ﬁ-
nancially mature you are, and we will tell you what exchange rate regime
you’ll end up with through globalization!”
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In section 9.2, we set
the stage by considering the evidence on global ﬁnancial integration from
1880 to 1997, using the well-known Feldstein-Horioka approach. The con-
tribution of our work is that it combines both cross-section and time series
dimensions with an extended sample of emerging countries to show a num-
ber of disturbing facts that suggest that ﬁnancial globalization varies a lot
depending on the type of country—core (advanced) or periphery (emerg-
ing)—and the type of regime (ﬂoating, ﬁxed) we consider. This leads to the
conclusion that ﬁnancial integration today is primarily an advanced country
phenomenon, while the link with the exchange rate regime is a complex one.
Section 9.3 lays out the ﬁnancial maturity hypothesis and presents nar-
rative evidence for the pre-1914 period of the diﬀerent experiences of the
core and peripheral countries in adhering to the gold standard.
Section 9.4 presents some empirical evidence on the link between ﬁnan-
cial depth and the exchange rate regime for core (advanced) and peripheral
(emerging) countries 1880–1913 and today.
Section 9.5 summarizes our ﬁndings and suggests some lessons from his-
tory.
9.2 Financial Integration, Exchange Rate Regimes, and Hollowing Out
In this section, we use saving-investment correlation tests (Feldstein and
Horioka 1980). Saving-investment (S-I) tests seek to measure the degree of
420 Michael D. Bordo and Marc Flandreau
2. The main focus of our study is the exchange rate arrangements of the two periods of glob-
alization (i.e., of open capital markets and relatively open trade). We do not take a stand on
why the global system collapsed after 1918 (or, more correctly, after 1931) and was not reat-
tained until the 1980s. We are sympathetic to the view that the deglobalization of the middle
two quarters of the twentieth century had a lot to do with the disruptive “second thirty years’
war” that began in 1914 and only really ended with the end of the cold war. We are agnostic on
the views of those who see the breakdown of the global system as related to ﬂaws of the gold
standard and to those who see it as a backlash to the excesses of the earlier age of globalization.ﬁnancial integration by examining the relationship between saving and in-
vestment. Integration is high if the correlation of a regression of investment
on saving is low and vice versa: In the latter case investment is constrained
by  domestic savings, whereas it is not in the former case. Feldstein-
Horioka’s analysis sparked a considerable research eﬀort. One important
area of research was the analysis of the historical behavior of correlation
coeﬃcients in order to document the historical progress of international ﬁ-
nancial integration. Standard references in this ﬁeld are Bayoumi (1990),
Tesar (1991), Zevin (1992), Eichengreen (1992), Obstfeld (1995), Jones and
Obstfeld (1997), Bayoumi (1997), and Obstfeld and Taylor (1998).3 These
works outline the now famous inverted U-shaped pattern of ﬁnancial inte-
gration, which is obtained when one plots the results from a series of annual
cross-section regressions for the period 1880–1995 (ﬁg. 9.1).4 The message
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3. See Flandreau and Rivière (1999) for a survey.
4. The countries were Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland,
France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Iceland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Norway, New Zealand,
the Netherlands, Portugal, Russia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and the
United States. For data sources see appendix to Flandreau and Rivière (1999), available on re-
quest.
Fig. 9.1 The inverted U-shaped pattern of ﬁnancial integration
Source: Flandreau and Rivière (1999).seems to be that, after the interruption of the interwar years, the world is
heading toward reglobalization that recalls nineteenth-century patterns.
We refer to this as the “folk view.”
9.2.1 Taking Panel Econometrics Seriously
We seek to show that this wisdom is too simple and conceals a number of
ﬁner phenomena. This is done by extending existing analyses in two critical
directions. First, we supplement the traditional cross-section regressions by
panel estimates. Second, when this can be done (i.e., for the post-1973 period)
we supplement the traditional group, of primarily advanced countries that
researchers have been looking at, with a large sample of emerging countries.
The importance of panel econometrics for analyzing S-I correlation was
emphasized by Krol (1996), Coiteux and Simon (2000), and Flandreau and
Rivière (1999). Panel data such as those used in Feldstein-Horioka (FH) re-
gressions have two dimensions. Research on the long-run behavior of S-I
regressions has focused on the interindividual dimension, computing cross-
section regressions either on annual data on or individual averages for given
periods. These latter estimates are known as between-estimates. They may
be thought of as generalizations of pointwise cross-section regressions.
One problem with between-estimates, though, is that they introduce a
number of biases in the estimation technique. For instance, they tend to
overestimate “true” disintegration when current accounts experience fre-
quent reversals, because averaging wipes out those reversals. This is why
“within”-estimates are in our view a much sounder measure, because they
highlight an essential dynamic dimension of ﬁnancial integration by focus-
ing on the ability of countries to ﬁnance changesin their current account po-
sition. Indeed, within estimates measure whether increases in investment
above average can occur without running into an investment constraint. A
third possible estimate, known as “pooling,” gives equal weight to the time
and individual dimensions.
Figure 9.2 shows the results of computing triplets of estimates (pooling,
within, between) for the standard subperiods people have focused on and
for the typical group of countries for which such estimates have been com-
puted before. As can be seen, while the popular inverted U-shaped pattern
is discernible, the precise picture depends on the estimator used.
Although the three estimates give a similar picture for the pre-1914 pe-
riod, within-estimates suggest that the interwar was less closed than has
been assumed, probably because the frequency of current account reversals
during those years tends to average out the countries’ short-term ability to
use foreign capital. Moreover, we observe huge discrepancies among the
various estimates for the period after 1973. This suggests that although
some countries have dramatically increased their ability to use the foreign
capital market, the sample’s ability at ﬁnancing current account imbalances
has increased much less. In what follows we shall accordingly give special
422 Michael D. Bordo and Marc Flandreauweight to the within-estimates, which might sound as a better measure,5 al-
though for the sake of completeness, we will report all three measures.
9.2.2 Regimes of Financial Integration
Having emphasized the importance of panel estimates, our strategy is the
following: Using a sample similar to the one previous scholars have worked
with, we replicate benchmark estimates of S-I correlation by subperiods
and compare these with the estimates one obtains for subgroupings that we
think may be relevant, because they were characterized by arrangements
implying exchange rate stability.6
In this fashion, we identify (a) gold countries before 1914; (b) gold coun-
tries, gold bloc members, and sterling area members in the interwar; (c)
countries that pegged to the dollar under the ﬁxed Bretton Woods era;7and
(d) members of the European exchange rate mechanism (ERM) after 1979.8
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Fig. 9.2 Integration coeﬃcients: Folk sample
5. As will be seen, the standard errors of between-estimates are always larger than those of
the two alternative estimators.
6. Our sample only diﬀers from the existing one in that some corrections were made. For in-
stance, the sample used by Eichengreen, Taylor, and others has France importing capital be-
fore 1914; whereas Lévy-Leboyer shows that it was exporting. See Flandreau and Rivière
(1999) for a discussion of alternative samples.
7. We identiﬁed the arrangements using data from Bordo and Schwartz (1996), Bordo
(1993), and Ghosh et al. (1995).
8. We compute this restriction rather than a restriction to ﬁxed exchange rate regimes be-
cause of problems with identifying these regimes to which we return to below.Our goal is to see whether these groupings succeeded in achieving signiﬁ-
cantly higher levels of integration than the sample at large. The intuition is
that, if exchange rate stability is an instrument meant to unlock participat-
ing countries’ current account constraints, then we should observe lower
betas for subgroupings than for the sample at large (see ﬁg. 9.2).
Table 9.1 displays the results.9 They show that for the pre–World War I
period, countries that strictly adhered to gold do not seem to have been able
to achieve a signiﬁcantly greater degree of ﬁnancial openness than those
who did not. The estimated beta for both the entire population and the re-
stricted sample shows ﬁgures that are very close to each other so that it is
impossible to reject the null that they are the same.
The interwar years reveal an interesting pattern: We see that countries
that adhered to gold, as well as members of the sterling zone, actually
achieved less integration than the international average reported in table
9.3. The straightforward interpretation of this is probably that members of
the interwar gold standard could only retain membership through capital
controls, thus actually achieving less integration than the sample at large. A
similar result is in fact obtained for the Bretton Woods period, probably for
the very same reason.
Finally, moving to the recent experience, we see that ERM membership
did succeed in reducing the beta parameters compared to the entire
sample.10 At the same time, since we know that the making of the euro was
accompanied by a companion capital movement liberalization within Eu-
ropean countries, it is not clear whether the greater integration is due to ex-
change rate stability or to lower controls.
At this stage, one forceful conclusion that emerges is that ﬁxed exchange
rate regimes were not in the nineteenth century an instrument for ﬁnancial
integration. Financial integration has been directly related to the presence
or absence of capital controls, and these controls have been used in periods
of both ﬁxed and ﬂexible exchange rates. The pre-1914 period stands out as
one that was exceptionally free from these controls rather than one whose
globalization was related to exchange rate stability since, as observed, the
restriction of the integration coeﬃcient to those countries that did not ﬂoat
is not higher than the one obtained by the entire sample. In fact, it is quite
striking to see that even with ﬁxed exchange rates, even with no capital con-
trols at all, the degree of integration achieved was not perfect. We think that
these ﬁndings are consistent with the notion that globalization in the nine-
teenth century caused the adoption of the gold standard, rather than the
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9. Similar results can be found in Flandreau and Rivière. The only diﬀerence comes from
minor updates in the database.
10. In this part, we use the folk sample. The very low pooling and between-estimates come
from the inclusion of Luxembourg. Results without Luxembourg are respectively P: 0.700, W:
0.521, B: 0.819, and for the restriction to Europe P: 0.551, W: 0.502, B: 0.664. As can be seen,






























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.other way round, and the remainder of the paper shall seek to develop this
intuition.
9.2.3 Expanding the Horizon: Developed
and Emerging Integration since 1973
In order to go beyond these ﬁndings, we extend existing analyses in a sec-
ond direction. We seek to expand the folk sample used in the literature
(essentially, developed countries plus Argentina) to include for the more
recent period a large number of emerging countries in Asia and Latin
America. Although data availability limits the number of emerging coun-
tries that can be identiﬁed during the late nineteenth century (and thus the
signiﬁcance of tests conducted on more limited samples), such is not the
case for the more recent period. This enables us to make systematic com-
parisons between performances in the core (advanced) and in the periphery
(emerging).11 For this purpose we constructed an expanded database com-
prising forty-six countries and spanning the period 1973–98. The folk data-
base is embedded in this broader set.12To document the properties of the ex-
panded sample, we run cross-section regressions for the period after 1973.
As can be seen in ﬁgure 9.3, the trend toward greater ﬁnancial integration
after 1973 captured by estimates based on the folk sample (the right part of
the inverted U) mostly reﬂects the properties of the sample itself. In other
words, it shows that there was indeed a process of ﬁnancial integration, but
this process varied a lot along the individual dimension, as illustrated by the
increase in the cross-section correlation for emerging countries in the sec-
ond half of the 1980s. Moreover, extracting from the sample countries be-
longing to the European Union shows that the trend toward greater inte-
gration that many authors have emphasized is truly a story about European
integration. The disproportionate share of European nations in the sample
has led scholars—unknowingly—to eurocentric conclusions.
In line with the previous discussion, however, it is obvious that one can-
not restrict one’s attention to these cross-section estimates, as telling as they
are. In a second stage, we thus use our new sample to compute benchmark
estimates and test in a second stage whether restrictions to given exchange
rate regimes are associated with higher or lower levels of integration.
The identiﬁcation of exchange rate regimes is more complex today than it
was one century ago when the choice was between paper and gold. We de-
cided to rely on the Masson and Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger (LYS) clas-
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11. Earlier exercises in Flandreau and Rivière (1999) based on the Folk’s sample plus ﬁve
emergers suggested that the record of peripheral countries might be diﬀerent from that of de-
veloped ones.
12. The additional countries are Brazil, Chile, China, Colombia, Egypt, Hong Kong, Hun-
gary, India, Indonesia, Israel, Malaysia, Mexico, Peru, the Philippines, Poland, the Czech Re-
public, Russia, Singapore, South Africa, South Korea, Thailand, Turkey, Uruguay, and Vene-
zuela. For data sources, see data appendix to Flandreau and Rivière (1999), available on
request, and the IMF’s International Financial Statistics.siﬁcations of countries by type of exchange rate regime (Masson 2001; LYS
2001). Both provide country classiﬁcations that recognize that modern ex-
change rate regimes can be of the ﬁxed, ﬂoating, or intermediary category.
Since one needs to cross the information available in our sample and that
available in either the Masson or LYS databases, one is bound to lose some
countries or observations in the process. We end up with two restricted data-
bases of forty-two (Masson) or thirty-ﬁve (LYS) countries, whose properties,
when one considers both samples in their entirety, are almost identical.13
The Masson classiﬁcation works with the International Monetary Fund
(IMF) categories but follows an earlier IMF study by Ghosh et al. (1995)
which demarcated the IMF’s twenty-six categories into just three (ﬂexible,
intermediate, and ﬂoating).14 Masson rearranges the Ghosh categories by
deﬁning ﬂexible as strictly independent ﬂoats and ﬁxed as hard pegs (cur-
rency boards and announced pegs with no change in parity), with the re-
mainder classiﬁed as intermediate. As a result Masson has a much smaller
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13. We checked this by running pooling-within-, and between-estimates. Results (available
upon request) are virtually identical, a result of the broad overlap between the two samples.
14. Flexible arrangements included crawling pegs, target zones, managed ﬂoats, and inde-
pendent ﬂoats. Pegged arrangements include single currencies, special drawing rights (SDR)
pegs, other oﬃcial basket pegs, and secret pegs.
Fig. 9.3 Financial integration 1973–97: Diﬀerence between advanced and emerging
countriesnumber of truly ﬁxed or truly ﬂexible regimes, with the bulk of the sample
being made of intermediate regimes.
The LYS indicators use measures of the volatility of exchange rates and
international reserves and cluster analysis to classify countries into four
groups (ﬂoating, dirty ﬂoating, crawling pegs, and ﬁxed).15 The classiﬁca-
tion is based on the theoretical prior that countries that really ﬂoat should
have greater exchange rate volatility and smaller international reserve
movements than those that do not. We further classiﬁed the LYS classiﬁca-
tion into three by combining dirty ﬂoats and crawling arrangements into an
intermediate category. Thus, our rearrangement of the LYS classiﬁcation
gives much weight to the tails.
The results we get from these exercises are documented in table 9.2. First,
it appears that there are several patterns of ﬁnancial integration. We ﬁnd im-
portant distinctions among emergers, and also among regimes. In practice,
whereas Asian countries are less ﬁnancially open than the average, Latin
American nations are more open for both the Masson and LYS databases.
The eﬀects of alternative exchange rate regimes on ﬁnancial integration
are also interesting. Developed countries are more integrated when they ﬁx,
but to a certain extent also when they ﬂoat, at least according to LYS. This
is interesting because ﬂoating developed countries are typically made of
large mature economies with sophisticated ﬁnancial systems, such as Great
Britain or the United States, whereas ﬁxing developed countries typically
include small open economies such as Austria.
We  take these results as illustrating how ﬁnancially deep economies,
while ﬂoating, can nonetheless achieve high levels of ﬁnancial integration
that can compare with nineteenth-century gold standard records. On the
other hand, smaller countries may ﬁnd themselves opting for a ﬁxed ex-
change rate regime because they are very open rather than being open be-
cause they have a ﬁxed exchange rate system.
Emerging countries face varied experiences: As can be seen from the
Masson database, emerging Latin countries are highly integrated at both
ends of the exchange rate regime spectrum, with intermediate regimes be-
ing less integrated. Something similar is also perceptible in the LYS data-
base, especially if we recall the greater signiﬁcance we attach to the within-
estimates. For Asian countries, by contrast, the opposite is obtained: There,
intermediary regimes correspond to comparatively higher, not lower, levels
of integration than extreme ﬂoats or ﬁxed regimes. However, even for the in-
termediate category the degree of integration achieved is very low.
This certainly gives support to Fischer’s view that developing countries,
which are not very exposed to international capital ﬂows, have the oppor-
tunity to adopt intermediate exchange rate options (Fischer 2001). To us,
428 Michael D. Bordo and Marc Flandreau
15. They also have another category, called “inconclusive,” which results from the statistical
































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.these results clearly support the notion that more open countries will end
up either in a ﬁxed exchange rate system or in a ﬂexible one.
To sum up, we found that a large part of the extensive integration that the
advanced countries have achieved has to do with European integration that
has been able to drive Europe over and beyond what has been achieved
elsewhere under both ﬁxed and ﬂexible exchange rates. We think that this
should be seen as a result of the liberalization of ﬁnancial services, which
Europe has implemented, rather than as a result of the exchange rate regime
per se. A number of advanced ﬂoaters have in eﬀect been quite good at im-
plementing ﬁnancial openness: Although a ﬁxed exchange rate regime in
advanced countries often goes with higher integration, a ﬂexible one might
do quite well too.
Moreover, our results support the hollowing-out hypothesis for emerging
countries, since they show that the trend toward greater integration has split
Latin America into two groups, where ﬁnancial integration has in turn
forced the adoption of either ﬂoating or ﬁxed exchange rate regimes. By
contrast, Asia has been able to retain intermediate and both ﬁxed and ﬂoat-
ing exchange rate regimes because it has remained on average more ﬁnan-
cially closed than the rest of the world.
In other words, the exchange rate regime is a product of globalization,
and globalization has caused a polarization between ﬂoating and ﬁxed ex-
change rates—a process known as hollowing out. Only those who have
maintained a degree of ﬁnancial insulation have been able to postpone the
choice. Again, globalization appears to have been the driving force.
9.3 Brave New World: Is Financial Vulnerability a Discovery of the 1990s?
The previous section has suggested that causality goes from globalization
to the exchange rate regime.16 In this section, we carry on with this line of
analysis. We survey the recent literature on exchange rate regimes and ﬁ-
nancial crises and argue that it has a lot to say about nineteenth-century
macroeconomic problems.
9.3.1 Exchange Rate Regimes and Financial Crises:
The Modern Literature
The experience of both advanced and emerging countries on ﬁnancial
crises teaches us that pegged exchange rates invariably succumb to specula-
tive attacks. From a theoretical point of view, this can be explained as a re-
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16. In a previous draft of this paper we used gravity equations to analyze the relationship be-
tween trade integration and the exchange rate regime. Our results for the 1880–1919 period
complement those presented above for ﬁnancial integration and the exchange rate regime. We
found, among other things, that exchange rate volatility did not signiﬁcantly hinder bilateral
trade, and although adhering to gold was associated with greater trade, it seems as if this is ex-
plained by deeper institutional forces at work.sult of growing tensions between the peg and domestic economic conditions
(Krugman 1979; Obstfeld 1984). The general lesson seems to be that the
only alternatives in the face of mobile capital are ﬂoating or a hard ﬁx such
as a currency board, dollarization, or membership in a monetary union.
Thus, the “corner solutions” literature has developed on the notion that
emerging countries (and to a certain extent developed ones as well) must
choose between ﬁxed and ﬂoating regimes, but cannot durably remain in
any intermediary system. More fundamentally, the ﬂexible corner has come
under further attack in the “fear of ﬂoating” literature—according to which
seemingly ﬂexible countries do not truly ﬂoat, because in eﬀect, such a pol-
icy is for them both ineﬃcient and dangerous. The argument runs as fol-
lows: In principle, a country that experiences a shock can adjust by lower-
ing the exchange rate. This is supposed to enable that country to enjoy
transitorily lower interest rates so that output may recover. But according
to Hausmann et al., (1999), this aspirin, although it may have been good
medicine for European nations in the 1990s, in eﬀect gives headaches to
Latin American countries. According to this view, the record for Latin
American countries is that letting the exchange rate go forces an increase in
interest rates and causes a major decline of output.
This is because exchange rate depreciation in turn triggers a capital ﬂight,
perhaps because that country relies heavily on foreign capital (so that ex-
change rate depreciation signals serious problems ahead). Another mecha-
nism goes through the share of external debt that is denominated in a
foreign currency. Today, only a very limited number of about twenty-ﬁve
countries can issue debt in their own currency. As a result, exchange crises
may cause a debt crisis. In such a setting, emerging markets would be better
oﬀ pegging, even if rampant “peso” problems imply for them that pegging,
whatever the amount of glue they use, does not automatically buy lower in-
terest rates. At least, the argument goes, countries doing so would be pro-
tected from short-term external disturbances, which they would not have to
shore up against.
9.3.2 Credibility, Interest Rates, and Monetary Policy
For students of the gold standard, it is striking how familiar the modern
view sounds, if only we look carefully at the record. The European aspirin,
on the one hand, closely resembles what a large body of literature has de-
scribed as the normal state of aﬀairs for core members of the gold standard.
Because exchange depreciation (be it the result of suspended convertibility
or a widening of the gold bands through the well-known “gold devices”)
was not expected to last,17 these nations, often also the more developed
ones, enjoyed a measure of short-term policy ﬂexibility that enabled them
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17. This is the logic of what Bordo and Kydland (1995) refer to as the gold standard as a con-
tingent rule.to buﬀer transitory shocks, very much in the same fashion modern devel-
oped ﬂoaters can: Exchange rate depreciation did not induce capital ﬂight.
Recent tests have suggested that in eﬀect, support was provided by the
market itself, which took bets on the eventual reappreciation of the cur-
rency, thus enabling monetary authorities to lower interest rates and thus
compensate for declining output; in other words, the gold points served as
a credible target zone (Hallwood, MacDonald, and Marsh 1996; Bordo and
MacDonald 1997). Working with data from the Vienna forward market,
Flandreau and Komlos (2001) have shown that modern target zone theory
was in fact invented and successfully applied in Austria-Hungary in the
early twentieth century, once it had stabilized its currency. In the case of
large foreign shocks (such as during the crisis of 1907) Austria-Hungary
would let its exchange rate go. This triggered stabilizing expectations that
enabled the monetary authorities to keep a lower interest rate than abroad,
with speculators taking bets on an eventual reappreciation.
Thus, to a certain extent, the current trend toward ﬂoating in advanced
countries has some resemblance to a classical gold standard in which the
ﬂuctuation margins have been, in line with Keynes’ (1931, 314–31) pro-
posal, widened to give more ﬂexibility. The key diﬀerence between then and
now is that the nominal anchor—gold parity, around which the target zone
operated—has been jettisoned and a domestic nominal anchor has been
substituted in its place, which allows exchange rate ﬂexibility without the
constraints of a target zone. Thus if the degree of ﬂexibility compared to the
gold standard is greater, the spirit is the same, a point to which we will come
back later.18
This possibility for the core countries of the classical gold standard era to
actually manage the money supply despite the gold constraints is in sharp
contrast with what countries in the European periphery, in Asia, or in Latin
and Central America could do.
On the one hand, ﬂoating did not create much room for them to conduct
active monetary policies. Exchange depreciation often triggered expecta-
tions of further depreciation rather than expectations of eventual stabiliza-
tion. For instance, Flandreau and Komlos (2001) show that, intriguingly
enough, it was the stabilization of the Austro-Hungarian currency that
opened the door to active monetary policies. During the infamous period
of exchange rate gyrations that extended until the mid-1890s, exchange de-
preciation was not usually followed by expectations of an eventual recov-
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18. Thus, we are not arguing that monetary authorities are following a target zone approach,
as advocated by (for example) Bergsten and Williamson (1983). Rather, we are arguing that the
credibility of adhering to gold convertibility gave the core countries before 1914 the ﬂexibility
to conduct discretionary policy within the gold points as if they were operating in a target zone
à la Krugman (1991) and Svennson (1994), whereas today the credibility attached to following
monetary rules such as inﬂation targeting gives the monetary authorities the freedom to oper-
ate with much greater ﬂexibility without the bands of a target zone.ery—unlike what would happen when the country regained credibility af-
ter joining the gold standard in 1896.
On the other hand, going onto gold did not buy immediate credibility, as
illustrated by the levels of short-term interest rates in a number of typical
members of the periphery. Figure 9.4shows that the weaker members of the
gold club faced higher short-term interest rates even when on gold than is
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A
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Fig. 9.4 Short-term interest rates (bank rates), 1880–1913, compared to United
Kingdom: A, Chile; B, Greece; C, Portugal; D, Russia; E, Italy
Source: See appendix.
Note: Shaded areas represent periods when each country was on the gold standard.C
D
E
Fig. 9.4 (continued)consistent with their actual exchange rate record. This suggests some kind
of peso problem. The high short-term rates faced by Chile, Greece, Portu-
gal, Italy, or Russia during their more or less extended ﬂirt with gold sug-
gest that the problems that the modern periphery has with pegging have
nineteenth-century precedents. The fact that even when on gold these coun-
tries could face high short-term interest rates might explain why some of
them ended up ﬂoating. An interesting case from that perspective is Chile,
whose attempt at returning onto gold in 1895–98 involved both a sharp in-
crease in interest rates—because that decision was not credible—and a
substantial fall in the rate of inﬂation, with the result that the stabilization
was associated with huge real interest rates, recession, and a quick reversal
to ﬂoating exchange rates (Subercaseaux 1926). Plus ça change . . . 
9.3.3 Fear of Floating, Nineteenth-Century Style:
A New View of the Gold Standard
If going on gold was so costly for the periphery, one may wonder why a
number of countries nonetheless sought to stick to gold. We argue that this
choice rested on something quite similar to the current fear-of-ﬂoating
dilemma. If ﬁxing was quite painful under the gold standard for many of the
peripheral countries, ﬂoating could be just as deadly as today. This was due
to pervasive problems of currency mismatch arising from the inability, for
underdeveloped borrowing countries, to issue foreign debts in their own
currency.
It is well known from the works of historians that the ﬁnancial markets of
the less developed countries were very backward.19 This led governments of
the European or Latin American periphery to issue their debts in the large ﬁ-
nancial markets of the core countries, such as London, Amsterdam, Paris, or
later Berlin, which by contrast had developed early on (Neal 1990). In eﬀect,
the investors in peripheral countries developed the habit of holding that part
of their wealth which they invested in domestic bonds in the large markets of
the core countries (Broder 1975; Lévy-Leboyer 1976; De Cecco 1990).
Borrowing abroad also implied borrowing in foreign currencies. Today,
many emerging countries ﬁnd it impossible to borrow abroad in their own
currency. Ricardo Hausmann and various co-authors20 refer to these na-
tions as suﬀering from “original sin.” Something similar existed one century
ago. According to John Francis (1859), exchange rate guarantees in inter-
national bond issues were an innovation that had been pioneered by the
London Rothschilds.21 The guarantees were widely used during the boom
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19. See Rousseau and Sylla (ch. 8 in this volume).
20. See Hausmann et al. (1999), Hausmann, Pannizza and Stein (2000), Fernandez-Arias
and Hausmann (2000), and Eichengreen and Hausmann (1999).
21. Previous to the advent of Mr. Rothschild, foreign loans were somewhat unpopular in
England, as the interest receivable abroad, subject to the rate of exchange, liable to foreign
caprice, and payable in foreign coin. He introduced the payment of the dividends in England,
and ﬁxed it in sterling money, one great cause of the success of these loans in 1825” (298–99).
See also Ferguson (1998, 132–34).of Latin American bond issues of the 1820s (Fodor 2000). As foreign in-
vestment soared, this practice became widespread. Prior to the advent of
the gold standard, countries were alternatively tied to gold, silver, or bi-
metallic currencies depending on the market they were tapping. With the
spread of the gold standard in Western Europe, gold clauses generalized.22
Fully comprehending the logic of these gold clauses is a theoretical chal-
lenge that is beyond the scope of this paper. It is not clear, for instance, why
investors should have preferred a lower exchange rate risk—but with a
greater default risk when exchange rate crises occurred—to a higher ex-
change rate risk but a lower risk of default.
One possible answer is that, in a system where instruments to hedge
against long-run exchange rate risks were not available, the clauses enabled
foreign investors to pass on the costs of exchange risk to issuing govern-
ments or corporations.23This was one way contemporaries rationalized this
practice, emphasizing that it was motivated by the risk aversion of foreign
investors.24 But this would imply that contemporaries were more willing to
run default risk than exchange rate risks.
Second, this practice might be understood as the solution to a commit-
ment problem. While local issues could be easily inﬂated away, foreign is-
sues with gold clauses provided safeguards, precisely because they in turn
induced governments to be on their guard (Missale and Blanchard 1990).
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22. Flandreau (2002) argues that this contributed to tying countries to the monetary system
of the ﬁnancial center on which they depended, thus contributing to the emergence of regional
groupings such as the Latin Union.
23. There were forward exchange markets, but only for a small number of currencies, and
only for short horizons (Einzig 1937). We are not aware of swap contracts that would have in-
volved long-term cover against exchange rate risk. The only kind of protection against ex-
change rate volatility would have been diversiﬁcation, which by deﬁnition does not provide full
insurance.
24. On Russia see de Block, (1889, 214): “Pour décider ces capitalistes à engager leurs fonds
dans une entreprise dont l’avenir pour eux état incertain, il fallut leur garantir un minimum
normal de revenu annuel sur les actions et obligations de chemins de fer russes, en ﬁxant ce
minimum sur l’étalon métallique” (In order to convince capitalists to put their money in proj-
ects whose success was for them uncertain, it was necessary to provide them with a guaranteed
minimum revenue on their railway bonds and stocks and to index this minimum on a metallic
standard). On Spain, Austria, and Hungary see Lévy (1901, 6): “Chez nous surtout où les ren-
tiers quelque peu timorés et mal au courant des questions de change ont marqué de tout temps
une grande répugnance à admettre dans leur portefeuille des titres don’t le revenu ne fût pas
stable; la première condition de cette ﬁxité du coupon étant celle de la monnaie la conséquence
naturelle de cette exigence légitime de notre public a été la création de monbreaux titres
étrangers stipulés payables en francs ou en or. L’un des premiers a été la rente espagnole ex-
térieure 3% depuis transformée en 4%; puis sont venues les rentes autrichiennes 4% or, la rente
hongroise 6% or” (In our country where rentiers are risk averse and not very conversant in ex-
change matters and have always been reluctant to take in their portfolio bonds whose income
is variable [and a necessary condition for revenue stability is the stability of the currency],
francs or gold clauses emerged as a natural requirement in many bond issues. One of the ﬁrst
was the Spanish rente 3 percent, then came the Austrian 4 percent, the Hungarian 6 percent).
On the United States, see Wilkins (1989, 619): “Often sovereign investors insisted on gold
clauses in railroad bonds. They wanted ‘sound money’ in America and worldwide. The US ad-
herence to a gold standard (after 1879) was in part a consequence of America’s desire to at-
tract such investment.”Figure 9.5 gives some support to this view because it shows that the share
of gold debt was an increasing function of total indebtedness for a number
of peripheral countries. On the other hand, it is hard to determine the ex-
tent to which markets and governments were in a position to internalize the
consequences of gold clauses plus exchange depreciation: In the politically
unstable, revolution-driven Latin America, could precommitment actually
work? Moreover, although commitment might explain why some debt
would have been issued with gold clauses, it is not clear why all debt issued
abroad should have included such clauses.
A ﬁnal possibility rests in the motivations of international bankers whose
syndicates arranged the loans. Because the bankers oﬀered a number of ser-
vices to cash-strapped government in periods of crisis, lending into arrears
and helping them to muddle through ﬁnancial trouble, they were also in a
position to impose a lot of conditionality (Flandreau 2002). This asymme-
try was often emphasized by contemporary observers: According to Lévy,
“The creation of debts denominated in the currency of the lending country
can be understood as resulting from the fact that it is the lending country
that dictates its conditions to the borrowing part” (1901, 6). It must be that
the bankers expected that the bonds they were prepared to guarantee would
face a deeper and more willing demand as a result of the gold clauses, and
they thus persuaded borrowers to issue their securities with ﬁxed exchange
rate clauses that tied the coupon to the unit of the market where the bonds
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Fig. 9.5 Total indebtedness and currency mismatch: Austria, Hungary, Portugal,
Greece, 1880–1913
Source: Crédit Lyonnais Archives as adapted by the authors.were sold.25 But then we are back to the question, why shouldn’t the regular
investor be willing to hold paper debts, provided he gets a return for it?
In any case, given the situation, the ﬁxed exchange rate clauses drew a
sharp line between those members of the core where there had been a long
record of adherence to a convertible standard and those who did not. As
one leading ﬁnancial economist of the time explained, robust gold convert-
ibility was an acceptable substitute for the gold clauses: “When it comes to
the bonds of countries where the gold standard prevails, such as Great
Britain, Sweden, Norway, Denmark or Canada, special clauses are not nec-
essary, since the obligation to pay in gold results from the fact that bonds
are denominated in the currency of that country” (Lévy 1901, 6).
This was certainly a reason why a number of countries became quite in-
terested in trying to ﬁnd ways to stabilize their currency in terms of gold.
Yet the gold standard was deﬁnitely not a perfect substitute for gold clauses,
since the club of countries that could issue abroad debts denominated in
their own currency was much more selective than the gold club (as illus-
trated later, in table 9.5, which shows the list of “senior” sovereigns in Lon-
don.26 These data come from Burdett’s Oﬃcial Stock Exchange Intelli-
gence.) Table 9.3 lists the bonds with various characteristics, including the
currency in which it was issued and the currency in which the coupon was
payable for ten major countries, eight of which issued bonds in their own
currencies without ﬁxed exchange rate clauses.27Other countries listed only
showed bonds issued in some gold-tied unit.28
The borderline members of the list (i.e., those for which the currency de-
nomination was ambiguous) provide interesting evidence that the mere sta-
bilization of the currency in terms of gold was not enough. As can be seen,
Austria-Hungary’s position is ambiguous. And as a matter of fact, we found
in separate French sources an interpretation of this problem: In the early
1890s, this country sought to stabilize its currency and deﬁned a new unit,
the crown, with a ﬁxed gold parity. At ﬁrst, market participants understood
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25. The ﬁxed exchange rate clause could come in various ways: either by denominating the
currency in the foreign currency, by denominating it in a gold or silver domestic unit that thus
had a ﬁxed exchange rate with foreign gold or silver units, or by stating the ﬁxed exchange rate
at which the coupon would be paid to foreigners regardless of the actual exchange rate against
paper money. From an economic point of view all these are equivalent.
26. The countries that could issue sovereign bonds in terms of their own currencies during
the period 1880–1914 were the United States, the United Kingdom, France, Germany, the
Netherlands, Belgium, Denmark, and Switzerland. Two additional countries included in the
table that listed sovereign debt in their own currency were Austria, Hungary and Italy. How-
ever, there is ample evidence to suggest that these bonds bore gold clauses. See Tattara (1999)
and Flandreau (2002).
27. For the United States, table 9.3 shows three bonds listed as payable in gold coin for the
years 1895, 1898, and 1900. The previous bonds shown are listed as “payable in the coin stan-
dard of the United States.” The changed status was a response to the silver uncertainty of the
1890s, to remove any ambiguity over which metallic coin was the standard. See Wilkins (1989)
and Laughlin (1903).
















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.that since the crown “only exists as gold unit, and there are no paper
crowns” a crown-denominated debt had to be understood as a gold debt
with an exchange rate “worth 1.05 French francs.”29However, once the Aus-
tro-Hungarian currency was stabilized and the crown became in 1900 the
actual unit of account, it was realized that Austria’s and Hungary’s crowns
debts were “without ﬁxed parities in terms of foreign currencies, [because]
Austria’s monetary regime is a paper regime. In the event of a crisis, the
value of the Austrian crown might experience depreciation.”30 This shows
that having a gold parity that was credible over the short run was not a per-
fect substitute for a very long-term commitment to exchange rate stability.
Having a large gold debt and experiencing an exchange rate crisis could
have devastating consequences. When a country embarked on a spending
spree and public debt increased, the share of gold-denominated debt in-
creased in its turn. This created an explosive mismatch. The crises of the
early 1890s—very much like those of the 1990s—provided evidence of the
mechanism at work. Argentina opened the dance: There, the expansion of
the gold debt (cedulas), accompanied by paper money issue, pushed the
level of the debt burden to unsustainable heights.31The interruption of cap-
ital exports that resulted increased the needs of a number of ﬁnancially
weak peripheral countries whose currencies depreciated in turn. As argued
in Flandreau (2002), the public debt crises in Portugal and Greece (in 1892
and 1893 respectively) both resulted from the depreciation of the exchange
rate that had brought these countries’ public debts to unsustainable levels.
The responses to these problems induced by high debts and ﬁnancial vul-
nerability were also surprisingly modern. Some countries, such as Spain or
Portugal, continued to ﬂoat but minimized their exposure by limiting their
borrowings abroad. Some others, such as Russia or Greece, developed de
facto currency boards. They accumulated gold reserves beyond what was
statutorily necessary and in eﬀect adopted stabilization cover ratios that
were consistently above 100 percent. Yesterday, like today, the response to
ﬁnancial vulnerability has been either a ﬂoat with reduced exposure to the
foreign capital market, or super-strong pegs. Hollowing out is a very old
thing.
This discussion should shed a new light on the abundant quotes that one
ﬁnds in the old literature regarding the importance of the gold standard as
a way to foster integration and which have so often been analyzed in the re-
cent literature as evidence of the ideology or “spirit” of the time.32 There
might in fact have been a lot more economic motivations behind these rec-
ommendations than is commonly acknowledged. Clearly, in view of the
Core, Periphery, Exchange Rate Regimes, and Globalization 445
29. Crédit Lyonnais Archives, date 1893.
30. Crédit Lyonnais Archives. The date of this statement, certainly not incidentally, is 1 May
1914.
31. See, for example, Eichengreen (1997).
32. See, for example, Gallarotti (1995) and Eichengreen and Temin (1997).narrow list of countries that were able to ﬂoat debts in their own currency,
much of the emerging world was bound to face problematic currency mis-
matches.33
From this point of view, gold adherence became for those willing to pro-
tect themselves against international ﬁnancial disturbances a second-best
solution. It is not that a gold standard immediately bought credibility.
Rather, it served as an insurance mechanism and in this sense fostered glob-
alization. In other words, the spread of the gold standard in the periphery
was an endogenous response to the gold clauses: As soon as the price of this
insurance decreased (as was the case during the gold inﬂation of 1896–
1914), the gold standard expanded, as more and more countries found it
less dangerous to borrow with gold clauses since the risk of being tipped oﬀ
gold declined.34
9.3.4 Exchange Rate Regimes and the Financial Maturity Hypothesis
A consequence of the analysis developed here is that logically, pre-1914
core countries that had developed strong money and ﬁnancial markets be-
fore WWI and were thus able to issue foreign debts in their own currency
ought to have ﬂoated—which they did not. At ﬁrst sight, this seems to be a
serious challenge to our view and may require a word of explanation. How-
ever, the evidence reported above, that core countries pioneered the use of
exchange rate adjustments within the gold points in a target zone fashion,
suggests that core countries were nonetheless exploiting to the fullest pos-
sible extent whatever ﬂexibility they had. In a sense, the seeds of a ﬂoating
exchange rate system were sown at the center.
The question still arises: Why did advanced countries before 1914 that
were ﬁnancially mature not ﬂoat as advanced countries do today? Possible
answers include the protection that gold gave to bond holders against inﬂa-
tion risk and the path dependency of gold as money.
Indeed, historians have emphasized that the rise of a large and liquid
market for government debt in the eighteenth and nineteenth century has
been the hallmark of ﬁnancial development. But this meant that at the be-
ginning of the process, domestic residents saving for their retirement had
their money mostly in the ﬁxed income portion of the market and would
446 Michael D. Bordo and Marc Flandreau
33. This was likely to become a serious problem for governments in the periphery, given the
role government undertakings had in the process of catching up in the late nineteenth century
(Gerschenkron 1962).
34. This explanation is not a mutually exclusive one. An alternative reason why periphery
countries may have favored gold standard adherence is that the gold standard served as a
“Good Housekeeping Seal of Approval”—a signal to lenders in the core that peripheral coun-
tries followed sound ﬁnancial policies. See Bordo and Rockoﬀ (1996) for evidence that sover-
eign debt spreads on London were lower for emerging countries that adhered strongly to gold
relative to those whose adherence was less conscientious and those on paper standards. Also
see Obstfeld and Taylor (ch. 3 in this volume). Flandreau, Le Cacheux, and Zumer (1998)
stress the role of gold inﬂation after 1896 as reducing the burdens of public debt for European
peripheral countries and hence making their adherence to the gold standard more sustainable.take a beating if governments inﬂated away.35 Thus the response, as in the
well-known British case, was to develop powerful parliaments that took the
power over money out of the hands of sovereigns and linked the domestic
unit to a weight of gold. But once this was done, this created strong con-
stituencies that resisted the devaluation of the unit in terms of gold.
This domestic mechanism was supplemented by an international one,
since in practice no single country could easily take the lead and move away
from the system and widen the ﬂuctuation bands, without raising the sus-
picion that it truly wanted to depreciate. In the end, core countries were
locked onto gold, and peripheral countries had either to ﬂoat or to lock
onto core countries. To give way, the gold standard needed some easily
identiﬁable external shock such as WWI. It took another six decades for a
universal ﬂoating exchange rate system based on a credible domestic nom-
inal anchor to be established (although earlier successful eﬀorts prevailed
in the United Kingdom and Sweden in the 1930s and in Canada in the
1950s).36
The history of the international monetary system for the advanced coun-
tries in the twentieth century has been well documented (Bordo and
Schwartz 1999; Redish 1996; Eichengreen 1996). The path dependency of
gold seen in adherence to some form of gold convertibility prevailed until
1971. The golden nominal anchor was stretched with the use of interna-
tional reserves in the interwar exchange standard and even more under the
Bretton Woods system, while monetary policies became increasingly
geared toward domestic goals.37 Ultimately the gold-based system became
unworkable, and it collapsed in 1971. The full shift to a credible domestic
nominal anchor and ﬂoating exchange rates in the 1970s and 1980s required
the development of deep and mature ﬁnancial markets discussed here and
in Rousseau and Sylla (ch. 8 in this volume) as well as the adoption of mon-
etary rules that in many ways echoed the functions of the gold standard con-
vertibility rule.
Thus today by contrast, the more ﬁnancially developed part of the world
has ﬁnally been able to exploit to its fullest possible extent its ability to ﬂoat.
As a matter of fact, the generalization today of ﬂoating in the developed
countries virtually encompasses the list of countries that can issue interna-
tional securities in their own currency, as we will discuss in section 9.4.
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35. In today’s world, where price indexes are systematically constructed by generally careful
institutions and are thus fairly consensual, the issue of determining the reasons why govern-
ments scarcely issue indexed bonds might be addressed (see, however, the mid-1990s contro-
versies on the inﬂation measurement problem in the presence of rapid technological progress).
But at the time the distrust of index numbers was not even a question.
36. The case for generalized ﬂoating was made clearly by Gottfried Haberler in the 1930s but
was rejected by the consensus view of the time that ﬂoating was destabilizing, see Bordo and
James (2001).
37. According to Bordo and Eichengreen (1998), had the Great Depression not intervened,
the gold exchange standard would have prevailed until the late 1950s.9.4 Financial Depth and the Exchange Rate Regime
The interpretation of the seemingly opposite nature of global exchange
rate regimes in the two big eras of globalization (ﬁxed exchange rates back
then, ﬂoating ones today) has put at the center of the picture the role of ﬁ-
nancial vulnerability and ﬁnancial crises. To some extent, the Baring crisis
yesterday played a role similar to the crises of the late 1990s in reminding
ﬂoaters about the dangers of an impervious ﬂexible exchange rate. As a re-
sult, whereas developed countries have always had the temptation and abil-
ity to ﬂoat (with ﬂoating restricted yesterday by path dependency and the
diﬃculty of creating domestic institutions that could create a domestic
nominal anchor), the periphery has always faced serious diﬃculties in ﬂoat-
ing, viewing the gold standard yesterday, and hard pegs today, as a second-
best solution.
The change in the dominant form of regime has implications as to where
we should ﬁnd greater ﬁnancial depth: In the pre-1914 era, when the gold
standard was the dominant monetary arrangement, we would expect coun-
tries adhering to goldto have greater ﬁnancial depth than those that did not.
In the post-1973 period, in which ﬂoating is the dominant regime, we would
expect by contrast that countries that can successfully operate pure ﬂoats
would also be more ﬁnancially developed than those that could not. How-
ever, those emerging countries that could not, or for other reasons—such as
considerable openness or close trading linkages to a large country—choose
not to ﬂoat and instead adhered to hard pegs (e.g., Hong Kong and Singa-
pore), would also have greater ﬁnancial depth than countries following in-
termediate regimes.
In this section we seek to investigate this prediction by looking at the
record of both the periods 1880–1914 and 1973–97 and attempting to iden-
tify the eﬀects of alternative exchange rate regimes on ﬁnancial depth,
which we proxy before 1914 by the ratio of a broad monetary aggregate
(M2) to gross domestic product (GDP) and after 1973 by similar variables
plus other broader measures, to be discussed below. These variables can in
turn be viewed as indicators of a set of factors that come under the rubric of
ﬁnancial maturity.38
9.4.1 The Classical Gold Standard, 1880–1913
Because of its biblical simplicity, the 1880–1913 period is an ideal testing
ground for our hypothesis that the dominant exchange rate regime, by
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38. Rousseau and Sylla (ch. 8 in this volume) list ﬁve attributes of a good ﬁnancial system,
which overlap our meaning of ﬁnancial maturity: sound public ﬁnance and debt management;
stable money; a sound banking system; a central bank to act as a lender of last resort and to
manage international ﬁnancial arrangements; and a well-functioning securities market. They
employ the same measure of ﬁnancial depth we do both as a determinant of economic growth
and as a determinant of international ﬁnancial integration.which we mean the more technically advanced, is associated with greater ﬁ-
nancial sophistication. Case studies of ﬁnancial development in the nine-
teenth century have emphasized that those countries which adhered to gold
in the 1880s, 1890s, and 1900s, such as France, Great Britain, and Germany,
were also the more ﬁnancially developed. This cross-section evidence is sup-
plemented by time series analysis such as in Gregory (1995) and Komlos
(1987), according to whom the Russian and Austro-Hungarian stabiliza-
tions in the 1890s were both associated with a considerable expansion of the
monetary base. In line with these earlier studies, we believe that the expan-
sion of real broad money would be a good proxy for ﬁnancial depth before
1914 because this was an era in which monetization (the spread of the
money economy) proliferated across the world, as did the growth of bank-
ing systems (Bordo and Jonung 1987).
To test systematically for the link between the exchange rate regime and
ﬁnancial development, we assembled a panel of data for twenty-three coun-
tries for 1880–1913.39 The panel includes both advanced (core) and less de-
veloped (periphery) countries.40 The strategy followed is to run panel re-
gressions of the log of M/Y (money to income ratio) on a number of
controls to see whether a dummy capturing the years in which a country ad-
hered to gold or did not, and another one capturing whether a country had
international sovereign bonds listed in terms of its own currency on the
London Stock Exchange in 1913, had positive and signiﬁcant eﬀects.41
Other things being equal, we would expect that our measures of ﬁnancial
depth would be higher under the gold standard than under paper money,
and for a country that can issue foreign bonds denominated in its own cur-
rency than for another that cannot.
To test this, it is necessary to control for other eﬀects. The ﬁrst is per
capita real income. From the literature on money demand, other things be-
ing equal, we would expect the elasticity of M/Y with respect to real per
capita income to be zero (Friedman 1959).42However, in the situation where
money balances are a luxury good and the income elasticity of money de-
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39. The data sources are listed in the appendix.
40. The advanced countries, demarcated both by income and by the fact that they were cap-
ital exporters (with the principal exception of the United States before 1900) were Belgium,
France, Germany, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, the United States, and Switzerland.
The emergers were Argentina, Australia, Austria-Hungary, Brazil, Canada, Denmark, Chile,
Finland, Greece, Italy, Japan, Norway, Portugal, Russia, Spain, and Sweden.
41. Gold standard adherence dates come from Bordo and Schwartz (1996) and Eichengreen
and Flandreau (1996). We did not distinguish between countries that left and returned to gold
at the same parities and those that altered their parities. The domestic currency bond dummy
is derived from information in table 9.5. We also ran the regressions using the log of real per
capita money balances as our measure of ﬁnancial depth. This, of course, is the traditional
measure of demand for money. The results are very similar to the ones we report below.
42. Real per capita income was expressed in 1913 U.S. dollars. The purchasing power par-
ity–adjusted data are from Maddison (1995). We also tried the unadjusted data in the regres-
sions below.mand is greater than one, as evidenced in Friedman and Bordo and Jonung
(1987) for a number of our countries for the pre-1914 period, then real in-
come per capita would be positively associated with our measure of ﬁnan-
cial depth. Thus, we would expect countries with high per capita income be-
fore 1914 to have greater ﬁnancial depth. Such countries would also more
likely be on the gold standard and would be able to issue bonds in terms of
their own currencies.
Figure 9.6 presents a scatter plot of M/Y and real per capita income
showing this relationship nicely.43 In the left-hand corner we see mainly pa-
per currency countries with low ﬁnancial depth that borrowed abroad in
sterling or had gold clauses. In the upper right-hand corner we observe
high-income countries with high M/Y who were on gold and could issue
bonds in their own currency, with the anomalies being easily explained.44
Similar ﬁgures for 1880–96 and 1897–1914 (not shown) nicely trace out the
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Fig. 9.6 M2-GDP and real per capita GDP (exchange rate regime, debt currency
denomination), 1880–1913
43. A similar pattern is observed comparing real per capita cash balances and real per capita
income.
44. Belgium and the Netherlands, with high per capita income but low ﬁnancial depth. This
reﬂects the fact that broad money data are unavailable for these countries before 1913 and we
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Table 9.4 Panel Estimates: Regressions with Fixed Eﬀects 1880–1913, Twenty-
Three Countries
Dependent Variable log M2-GDP
Independent Variable (1) (2) (3) (4)
Gold standard 0.082 0.102 0.099
[20.8] [26.6] [25.5]
(5.134) (5.686) (5.409)
Domestic currency bonds 0.102 0.083
[26.4] [21.1]
(4.632) (3.833)
Real per capita GDP (log) 0.266 0.263
(4.753) (4.684)
Short-term interest rate (log) –0.089 –0.089
(–3.780) (–3.887)
N 782 782 782 782
Notes: Generalized least squares (GLS) with cross-section weights; country dummies, and a
time trend (not shown in the table); t-values in parentheses; response percent in brackets.
transition from paper to gold by a large number of emerging countries as
their incomes and ﬁnancial development progressed.45
As controls in the regression we used the traditional determinants of the
demand for money: real per capita income (discussed above) and a short-
term interest rate. We would expect the short-term interest rate, represent-
ing the opportunity cost of holding money balances, as well as the presence
and spread of ﬁnancial assets as substitutes for money, to be negative.46
Other controls tried in the regressions (but not presented in the results be-
low) were the (log of the) consumer price index (CPI) inﬂation rate, to mea-
sure the opportunity cost of holding money relative to goods, and the ﬁscal
balance, because a tendency to run a deﬁcit might signal eventual attempts
to predate the ﬁnancial sector, thus causing, in line with our earlier discus-
sion, a persistence of domestic ﬁnancial underdevelopment as people con-
tinue to hold their balances abroad.
Table 9.4 shows log linear panel regressions for twenty-three countries
for M2-GDP including country (ﬁxed eﬀects) and a time trend. In column
(1) the gold adherence dummy is signiﬁcantly associated with a higher ratio
of M2 to GDP. Going from paper to gold is associated with a 21 percent
higher M2-GDP ratio (the response indicated in brackets).47Countries that
45. See Eichengreen and Flandreau (1996) for other factors explaining the transition.
46. For the short-term interest rate in most countries we used the oﬃcial discount rate. For
the core countries (United States, United Kingdom, France, Germany, and the Netherlands)
we used open market rates. For several countries where data on short-term interest rates are
unavailable we used long-term interest rates.
47. Calculated as in Halvorsen and Palmquist (1980).could issue sovereign debt in terms of their own currencies also had higher
ratios of M2-GDP by 26 percent (column [2]). The addition of real per
capita income and short-term interest rates to the regression with the gold
dummy (column [3]) shows signiﬁcant coeﬃcients for all regressors with
signs suggested by theory, the positive and greater than one coeﬃcient on
real per capita income agrees with earlier evidence in Bordo and Jonung
(1987). Finally, and quite importantly, the addition of the Bond dummy is
also signiﬁcant (column [4]).
In sum, these results suggest that countries that could adhere to gold were
ﬁnancially more developed. Also ﬁnancially developed countries were
those that could issue sovereign debt in terms of their own currency.48
9.4.2 1973–97
In this section, we conduct similar exercises for the current regime of
open capital markets and generalized ﬂoating. Our assumption is that to-
day, as in the previous era of globalized ﬁnancial markets, we would expect
that advanced countries would have greater ﬁnancial depth than emerging
ones and (ceteris paribus) would ﬂoat. Moreover, as emerging countries
moved toward advanced country status they would adopt the monetary
regime of the advanced countries. Thus we would expect to ﬁnd that, across
both advanced and emerging countries, ﬁnancial depth would be positively
associated with adherence to freely ﬂoating regimes relative to adherence to
other regimes.
A number of reasons, however, suggest that the clean results we reported
in the previous section might not be so easy to replicate in today’s world.
And since these aﬀect the regression strategy, it seems necessary to spend a
while discussing them. One reason is that the expansion of the real broad
money supply might not be as good a measure for today as it was for the
late nineteenth century, especially for the advanced countries because of
the development of other ﬁnancial assets as substitutes for money bal-
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48. As a sensitivity test, we ran a panel probit regression taking the choice of exchange rate
(adherence to gold or not) as the dependent variable and M2-GDP and the other controls from
table 9.4 as the independent variables. In the regressions the M2-GDP ratio was positive and
signiﬁcant but the bond dummy was insigniﬁcant. The coeﬃcient on M2-GDP suggests that a
1 percent increase in ﬁnancial depth would increase the probability of a country adhering to
gold by 6.5 percent. This result, compared to the coeﬃcient of the exchange rate variable
shown in the regression in table 9.4, raises the tricky issue of causality between ﬁnancial depth
and the exchange rate regime.
On the one hand, Rousseau and Sylla’s (ch. 8 in this volume) evidence that ﬁnancial devel-
opment is a key determinant of the earlier growth of today’s advanced countries and Eichen-
green and Flandreau’s (1996) ﬁndings that growth is a determinant of pre-1914 gold standard
adherence suggest that ﬁnancial development may explain the ability to adhere to gold. On the
other hand, adherence to the specie standard in Europe long predated modern growth, and
England’s switch to gold de facto in 1717 also preceded both modern economic growth and
much of England’s ﬁnancial development. Thus arguments for causality between the exchange
rate regime and ﬁnancial depth can go both ways.ances, as well as technological innovation, which economizes on cash bal-
ances.49
A second reason is that the simple menu of alternatives to ﬂoating that
prevailed in the late nineteenth century (peg to gold) has been replaced by
a more complex one: peg to the dollar, peg to the mark, peg to the euro, peg
to a basket, not to mention various intermediate arrangements ranging
from dirty ﬂoats and adjustable pegs to crawling pegs. These latter arrange-
ments purport to maintain some of the advantages of ﬂoating—monetary
independence and insulation from external shocks—with the advantages of
pegging.
A third reason is that, as a number of recent papers have argued, the IMF
classiﬁcation of exchange rate regimes, which is based on information pro-
vided by the member countries, may not reﬂect the true underlying regime.
Thus, Calvo and Reinhart (2000a,b) present evidence to the eﬀect that
countries that say they are ﬂoating show little variation in their exchange
rates but substantial variation in their international reserves and interest
rates and hence act more like peggers.
What we argue here is that the dose of “nineteenth-centurism,” which ac-
cording to us has survived in the periphery, implies that for those emerging
countries that are unable to successfully ﬂoat because a substantial portion
of their outstanding ﬁnancial obligations are denominated in dollars or
other advanced countries currencies, pegging would mean ﬁnancial deep-
ening—in a nineteenth-century fashion. This follows because the alterna-
tive of volatile exchange rates could have serious consequences for the
private sector’s balance sheet and hence for the real economy—manifest by
their inability to sell their debt denominated in their own currency in inter-
national markets. These countries would be better oﬀ, it is argued, if they
dollarized.
For these emerging markets, especially those of Latin America, Haus-
mann, Panizza, and Stein (2000) argue that greater ﬁnancial depth would be
associated with ﬁxed exchange rate arrangements (i.e., to peg as second
best).50Thus we may expect to see a bipolar pattern wherein advanced coun-
tries and some emergers that can emulate them have greater ﬁnancial depth
associated with ﬂoating, and others who cannot ﬂoat—or because of their
greater openness choose not to—have greater depth associated with ﬁxing.
In our empirical work, we use a panel of forty-four countries with data
from Bordo et al. (2001): twenty-two advanced countries and twenty-two
emerging countries.51 Exchange rate regimes are identiﬁed with dummies
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49. Thus, velocity (the inverse of M2-GDP) displays a U-shaped pattern over the past cen-
tury and across countries by levels of development (Bordo and Jonung 1987).
50. Also see Eichengreen and Hausmann (1999).
51. The twenty-two advanced countries are Australia, Austria-Hungary, Belgium, Canada,
Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands,constructed using the two exchange rate deﬁnitions discussed in section 9.2
(Masson 2001 and Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger 2001). To measure ﬁnan-
cial depth, as we did for the 1880–1913 period, we used the M2-GDP ratio.
However, as argued above, we might expect that this measure may not be as
good a proxy for ﬁnancial depth today as it was a century ago. As alterna-
tive measures of ﬁnancial depth we use three measures developed for the
World Bank by Beck, Demirguc-Kunt, and Levine (1999): FD1, deﬁned as
the ratio of private credit to GDP; FD2, deﬁned as private credit plus stock
market valuation to GDP; and FD3, deﬁned as FD2 plus private and public
bond market capitalization as a share of GDP.52
To  account for the domestic currency denomination of international
bonds we used two databases. The ﬁrst is the Bank for International Settle-
ments (BIS) data used by Hausmann, Pannizza, and Stein (2000), which
contain all international securities and bank loans by currency and issuer,
but only for the period 1993–97. Countries that issued international securi-
ties in terms of their own currency consisted of most of the Organization for
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) countries and in our
sample only four emergers: Hong Kong, Singapore, South Africa, and Tai-
wan. The second measure is all international bonds from data supplied by
the IMF. These data cover the period 1980–97 and again consist mostly of
OECD countries, plus seven emergers: Argentina, China, Hong Kong, Sin-
gapore, Korea, the Philippines, and South Africa. We deﬁned a dummy as
equal to one if a country could issue such securities.53
Finally, as in the 1880–1913 period, we used as controls in the regression:
per capita real GDP in U.S. dollars, short-term interest rates (open market
rates where available, otherwise deposit rates), the ratio of ﬁscal deﬁcit to
GDP, and the log of the CPI inﬂation rate. All these data come from IFS.
9.4.3 Results: All Advanced and Emerging Countries
We  present tables similar to those for the pre-1914 period. Table 9.5
shows the coeﬃcients of regressions of the log of M2-GDP on the Masson
and LYS ﬂoating exchange rate dummies, a dummy for the IMF indicator
of the issue of international bonds in domestic currency, and, as a control,
the short-term interest rate.54
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New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom, and the
United States. The twenty-two emerging countries are Argentina, Brazil, Chile, China,
Colombia, Ecuador, Hong Kong, Indonesia, Israel, Korea, Malaysia, Mexico, Paraguay, Peru,
the Philippines, Singapore, South Africa, Taiwan, Thailand, Turkey, Uruguay, and Venezuela.
52. See Khan and Senhadji (2000) for an earlier use of these measures to explain the pattern
of growth across emerging countries.
53. The dummy starts the year that the listings begin.
54. We also used the Bank for International Settlements (BIS) measure of bonds issued in
domestic currency. The results were usually similar, so because the data for these bonds only
cover ﬁve years we do not report them unless otherwise indicated. As an alternative to the log
of short-term interest rates we use the log of the inﬂation rate. The results using this variable
were almost identical to those using the log of interest rates, so we do not report them here. WeAs in the 1880–1913 regressions we include country ﬁxed eﬀects and a
time trend. We exclude real per capita income from the regressions shown
because the estimated income elasticity was close to zero (the income elas-
ticity with respect to real cash balances close to one). Indeed, the speciﬁca-
tion of the M2-GDP ratio we present is similar to the one ﬁrst used by La-
tane (1954) and by Lucas (1988).
In table 9.5 we present the results for all countries and then separately
foradvanced and emerging countries. As can be seen in columns (1) and (2)
for all countries, all three independent variables are signiﬁcant. Financial
depth increases on average when countries ﬂoat—according to the Masson
deﬁnition, by 24 percent; for the LYS, by 5 percent. When they can issue
bonds in terms of their own currencies, ﬁnancial depth increases by slightly
over 20 percent.55
For the advanced countries (see columns [3] and [4]), as in the case of all
countries, both ﬂoating exchange rate indicators are positive and signiﬁ-
cant, as is the bond variable in column (4).56For the emerging countries (see
columns [5] and [6]), the Masson dummy is positive and signiﬁcant at con-
ventional levels, whereas the LYS dummy is barely signiﬁcant at the 10 per-
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also do not report results for regressions including the ﬁscal deﬁcit–GDP ratio. That ratio was
often insigniﬁcant.
55. In the regressions in column (2) we used the BIS measure of local currency bonds be-
cause the IMF measure was not signiﬁcant.
56. Again, in column (4) we used the BIS bond dummy.
Table 9.5 Panel Estimates: Regressions with Fixed Eﬀects 1973–97, All Countries
Dependent Variable log M2-GDP
All Countries Advanced Countries Emerging Countries
Independent Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Masson ﬂoat 0.094 0.108 0.070
[24.1] [28.1] [17.5]
(3.614) (3.433) (1.677)
Levy-Yeyati- 0.020 0.031 0.021
Sturzenegger ﬂoat [4.8] [7.4] [5.1]
(2.010) (1.987) (1.592)
Domestic currency  0.081 0.087 –0.024 0.059 0.184 0.456
boards [20.5] [22.3] [–5.4] [14.7] [52.6] [186]
(6.424) (5.101) (–1.539) (3.167) (5.251) (4.199)
Short-term interest  –0.067 –0.074 –0.060 –0.049 –0.064 –0.093
rate (log) (–6.933) (–7.048) (–5.153) (–3.433) (–4.294) (–5.952)
N 1,025 1,008 500 504 525 504
Notes: GLS with cross-section weights; country dummies, and a time trend (not shown in the table); t-
values in parentheses; response percent in brackets. For columns (2), (4), and (6) we used the BIS bond
dummy.cent level. Also, the bond variable is signiﬁcant and positive in both speci-
ﬁcations.
We then ran similar regressions to those in the above tables but substi-
tuted the Masson and LYS ﬁxed exchange rate dummies for the ﬂoats used
in table 9.5; see table 9.6. For all countries both ﬁxed exchange rate dum-
mies were signiﬁcant and negative in a regression including the bond
dummy and the interest rate.
The same result obtained for the advanced countries using the Masson
dummy, with the LYS exchange rate indicator insigniﬁcant. Finally, for the
emerging countries, the Masson ﬁxed exchange rate dummy was negative
and signiﬁcant in all the regressions, whereas the LYS dummy was always
insigniﬁcant.57
In sum, the results from tables 9.5 and 9.6 for the 1973–97 period when
ﬂoating was the dominant exchange rate regime seem to be consistent with
those of the pre-1914 era in table 9.4, when gold was the dominant regime.
For advanced countries and, to a lesser extent, emerging countries, greater
ﬁnancial depth both as measured by M2-GDP and the ability to issue in-
ternational bonds in domestic currency is associated with ﬂoating.
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Table 9.6 Panel Estimates: Regressions with Fixed Eﬀects 1973–97
Dependent Variable log M2-GDP
All Countries Advanced Countries Emerging Countries
Independent Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Masson ﬁxed –0.110 –0.079 –0.268
[–22.4] [–16.7] [–46.1]
(–3.959) (–2.723) (–2.802)
Levy-Yeyati- –0.039 –0.026 –0.018
Sturzenegger ﬁxed [–8.6] [–5.8] [–4.0]
(–1.943) (–1.183) (–0.601)
Domestic currency  –0.065 –0.111 –0.060 –0.049 –0.077 –0.081
rate (log) (–6.807) (–11.696) (–5.007) (–3.477) (–5.351) (–5.326)
N 1,025 504 500 504 525 504
Notes: GLS with cross-section weights: country dummies, and a time trend (not shown in the table); t-
values in parentheses; response percent i brackets. For column (4) we used the BIS bond dummy.
57. As for the pre-1914 sample, we also reran the regressions above as panel probits with the
exchange rate regime dummies as dependent variable. Taking the ﬂoating exchange rates as de-
pendent variables we found that M2-GDP was generally positive and signiﬁcant for all the
country classiﬁcations using both the Masson and LYS indicators. Similar results obtained for
the bond dummies. Taking the ﬁxed exchange rate regime as dependent variable, M2-GDP was
generally negative and the bond dummy was insigniﬁcant. As was the case for the pre-1914 pe-
riod gold standard, the question of causality between ﬁnancial depth and the exchange rate
regime is diﬃcult to sort out. A deeper analysis of the circumstances of each country is likely
required.9.4.4 Latin America and Asia
The results from table 9.6 for a sample of emergers across the world sug-
gest that hard ﬁxers on average had lower ﬁnancial depth than others. These
results seem to contradict evidence presented in Hausmann, Panizza, and
Stein (2000) for Latin America suggesting that ﬁxers had greater ﬁnancial
depth. However, they may also be explained by the fact that emergers who
could ﬂoat were less ﬁnancially integrated than the advanced countries, as
seen in section 9.2, and by the aggregation of very diﬀerent categories of
emerging countries.
To correct for this, in table 9.7 we split the emerging sample of countries
into Latin America and Asia, presenting only the signiﬁcant results. For
Latin America we ﬁnd that the Masson ﬂoat dummy is positive and signif-
icant when introduced alone (but is insigniﬁcant with the addition of the in-
terest rate control), whereas the LYS ﬂoating dummy is negative and signif-
icant in the regressions with controls. At the same time, the Masson ﬁxed
exchange rate dummy is negative and signiﬁcant. Both bond dummies for
Latin America are always insigniﬁcant.
The LYS results that Latin American countries that ﬂoat do not have
greater ﬁnancial depth may be consistent with the evidence from the Feld-
stein-Horioka regressions in section 9.2 that Latin America is relatively ﬁ-
nancially open. The LYS results, which are based on the economic charac-
teristics of the regime, rather than on information supplied by the reporting
countries that lie behind the Masson dummies, may be more telling.
For Asia, we ﬁnd both ﬂoating indicators to be associated with greater ﬁ-
nancial depth, as is the domestic currency bond indicator, evidence that
some Asian countries may be able to emulate the advanced countries. How-
ever, the evidence from section 9.2 that ﬁnancial integration in Asia is less
than in Latin America may also explain why some Asian countries could
successfully ﬂoat. At the same time, the LYS ﬁxed exchange rate dummy is
also positive and signiﬁcant in column (9). This last result seems consistent
with the hollowing-out hypothesis.
In sum, for the emergers, the case is mixed. Although there is some evi-
dence for the group as a whole that ﬂoating was associated with greater ﬁ-
nancial depth and the ability to issue bonds denominated in domestic cur-
rency, we also ﬁnd when we disaggregate the emerging countries into Latin
America and Asia that, although some Latin American countries may have
had deeper ﬁnancial markets associated with ﬂoating, there was quite
strong evidence that Asian countries with ﬂoating exchange rates had
greater ﬁnancial depth than other countries, and moreover they seem to be
more mature than their Latin counterparts in terms of the ability to issue in-
ternational bonds denominated in their own currency (although, again,
they may have been able to achieve this because they were less open than
other countries). The evidence at the same time that some Asian countries



























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.with ﬁxed rates had greater ﬁnancial depth is consistent with both the hol-
lowing-out and “original sin” hypotheses.
9.4.5 An Alternative Measure of Financial Development
Finally, we experimented with regressions similar to those displayed in
the two previous subsections but taking as dependent variable the alterna-
tive measures of ﬁnancial development produced by the World Bank: FD1,
private credit to GDP; FD2, private credit plus stock market valuation to
GDP; and FD3, FD2 plus bond market capitalization to GDP.
The most signiﬁcant results were for FD2 and FD3, which were quite
similar. We show selected results taking the log of FD3 as dependent vari-
able for advanced and emerging countries, Latin America, and Asia in
table 9.8. The results for the advanced countries are almost identical to
those in table 9.5. For advanced countries greater ﬁnancial depth is asso-
ciated positively and signiﬁcantly with ﬂoating and the ability to issue se-
curities in domestic currency. This evidence may be important, because
these measures of ﬁnancial development, unlike M2-GDP, account for
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Table 9.8 Panel Estimates: Regressions with Fixed Eﬀects 1973–97
Dependent Variable log FD3
Advanced Countries Emerging Countries Latin America







Masson ﬁxed 0.200 0.546
[58.5] [251.3]
(3.41) (4.145)
Levy-Yeyati-Sturzenegger  0.271 0.344
ﬁxed [86.7] [120.6]
(4.725) (4.619)
Domestic currency bonds 0.55 0.063 –0.196
[13.6] [15.5] [–36.3]
(1.915) (2.304) (–3.737)
Short-term interest  0.072 0.025 –0.025 –0.010
rate (log) (3.615) (1.748) (–1.45) (–2.900)
N 440 440 462 462 210 242
Notes: GLS with cross-section weights; country dummies, and a time trend (not shown in the table); t-
values in parentheses; response percent in brackets. For column (2) we used the BIS bond dummy.the substitution away from money once an economy becomes fully mone-
tized.58
For the emerging countries the evidence unequivocally suggests that
greater ﬁnancial depth is associated with ﬁxed exchange rates. In addition
to the ﬁxed exchange rate results presented here, the various ﬂoating ex-
change rate indicators are negative. Similar evidence obtains for both Latin
America and Asia. Also of interest, the bond dummy is insigniﬁcant in
most of the regressions except for Asia, where it is negative and insigniﬁ-
cant.59 These results seem much more in accord with Hausmann’s “original
sin” hypothesis.
The question then arises: Which measure of ﬁnancial depth should we
pay more attention to, M2-GDP or FD3? For the advanced countries the
broader measure should surely be superior to M2-GDP, but this may not be
the case for the emergers because the stock and bond markets in these coun-
tries may still be in a nascent state, at least compared to the advanced coun-
tries.
9.4.6 Summary
In conclusion, the evidence presented in this section for the two eras of
globalization suggests some remarkable similarities. In general, countries
with greater ﬁnancial development followed the dominant regime—gold
before 1914, ﬂoating after 1973. Also, countries that issued international
bonds in terms of their own currencies could successfully follow the domi-
nant regime. The exchange rate experience of the advanced countries ex-
actly ﬁts this pattern.
The case of the emerging countries is, however, less clear. Before 1914
emergers went to great lengths to join the gold standard, and the ﬁnancial
performance of those who could not adhere was clearly worse. Today the in-
cidence of emergers who ﬂoat and who have greater ﬁnancial depth is less
than the pre-1914 incidence of emergers who adhered to gold. Those who
cannot ﬂoat but need access to international capital according to the “orig-
inal sin” theory must adhere to hard ﬁxes.
The evidence for the recent period is mixed on who has greater ﬁnancial
depth. According to the M2-GDP results, it is ﬂoaters based on the Masson
exchange rate indicator, although this is not evident from the LYS results,
which may be the more economically meaningful. But the FD3 (and FD2)
results see hard ﬁxers (especially those in Asia) as more ﬁnancially devel-
oped. In addition, the evidence for Asia that associates some countries’
ﬂoating experience with greater ﬁnancial depth may also be reﬂecting the
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58. This substitution process may also explain the positive coeﬃcient on the short-term in-
terest rate for the advanced countries.
59. Panel probit regression of the exchange rate regime dummies on FD3 revealed a pattern
of coeﬃcients similar to that in table 9.10, again raising the issue of causality.fact that Asia is less ﬁnancially open than Latin America so that it may be
capital controls (hidden or otherwise) that allow these regimes to be viable.
Thus we conclude that our empirical results for the emerging countries
today are in general consistent with both the hollowing-out and “original
sin” hypotheses. More research is clearly needed.
Finally, an important fact that emerges from the evidence in this section
is that the number of countries that could issue bonds in terms of their own
currencies has not increased all that much over the past century. Before
1914, it was eight. Today, it is about twenty-ﬁve. Virtually all of the expan-
sion is by countries like Canada, Italy, and Sweden who graduated to ad-
vanced status after WWI. There are very few emerging countries today in
either of the lists of bonds that we had access to, and most of them only en-
tered in late in the past decade. The question as to how countries graduate
from junior to senior country status in the bond markets is also a subject for
further research.
9.5 Conclusion: Financial Maturity—The Holy Grail
The traditional view is that ﬁxed exchange rate regimes are best for the
globalization of ﬁnancial markets. This view is based on the stellar perfor-
mance of the classical gold standard. Yet today we are in another era of
globalization as pervasive as the earlier one, and now the dominant regime
is ﬂoating. This paradox suggests at ﬁrst glance that globalization, rather
than being determined by the exchange rate regime, occurs independent of
the exchange rate regime. However, as we argue in this paper, although this
may be the case for advanced countries, it is not for emergers, whose regime
choice is in large measure driven by international ﬁnancial integration.
In this paper we focus on the diﬀerent historical regime experiences of the
core and the periphery. Before 1914, advanced countries adhered to gold
and periphery countries tried to emulate the core, especially when they were
concerned with attracting foreign capital. Because of their extensive exter-
nal debt obligations denominated in core-country currencies, peripheral
countries were especially vulnerable to ﬁnancial crises and debt default.
This made devaluations diﬃcult for them, leaving them with the diﬃcult
choice of ﬂoating but restricting external borrowing or devoting consider-
able resources to maintaining an extra-hard peg. Today, whereas advanced
countries can successfully ﬂoat, emergers must also borrow abroad in terms
of advanced country currencies and are afraid to ﬂoat for the same reason
as their nineteenth-century forebears. To maintain access to foreign capital
they may need a hard peg to the core-country currencies.
Thus the key distinction between core and periphery countries, both then
and now, that we emphasize in this paper is ﬁnancial maturity. It is evi-
denced in the ability to issue international securities denominated in do-
mestic currency, or what Ricardo Hausmann refers to as the absence of
Core, Periphery, Exchange Rate Regimes, and Globalization 461original sin. Indeed, our hypothesis is that countries that are ﬁnancially de-
veloped, in a world of open capital markets, should be able to ﬂoat as ad-
vanced countries do today. Evidence for the core countries that the classi-
cal gold standard operated as a target zone with the gold points serving as
bands in which credible ﬂoating could occur and external shocks could be
buﬀered is a presage of the regime followed today. Today’s ﬂoating is a prod-
uct of ﬁnancial maturity and the development of the technological and in-
stitutional structures and constraints that allow policymakers to follow
stable money and ﬁscal policy without adhering to an external nominal an-
chor.
We present several strands of evidence for our hypothesis that globaliza-
tion is largely independent of the regime for advanced countries but drives
the exchange rate regime for the periphery. First, evidence from Feldstein-
Horioka tests over the period since 1880 agrees with the folk wisdom that
ﬁnancial integration was high before 1914, as it is today. But the evidence
suggests that it was not the exchange rate regime followed that mattered, but
the presence of capital controls. Moreover, a comparison between ad-
vanced and emerging countries today suggests that although there is con-
siderable ﬁnancial integration among the advanced countries, most of
whom can ﬂoat, this is not the case for the emergers, and indeed those that
ﬂoat may do so because they are not ﬁnancially open.
Second, in section 9.3 we elaborate on the ﬁnancial vulnerability hypoth-
esis, which is related to the recent literature on original sin. Descriptive ma-
terial from the pre-1914 history of the periphery paints a very familiar pic-
ture of ﬁnancially “backward” countries required to borrow abroad in
sterling, francs, or marks, or with gold clauses, being hammered by the
crises of the 1890s, forced to devalue and default, and then devoting con-
siderable resources to obtain the gold reserves needed to adhere to gold as
if on a currency board (Russia, Greece) or ﬂoating but restricting foreign
borrowing (Spain, Portugal)—hollowing-out déjà vu. Future research will
have to explain the reasons for the inability many countries have faced, and
most probably will continue to face, when borrowing abroad.
Finally, in section 9.4 we present some empirical ﬁndings for the pre-1914
period showing a clear connection between the ability to borrow abroad in
domestic currency, gold adherence, and ﬁnancial depth. Extending our
methodology to the post-1973 era led to identical results for the advanced
countries whose dominant exchange rate regime is now ﬂoating (with the
exception of the European experiment with a monetary union).
For the emerging countries, however, it appears as if those that are ﬁnan-
cially open, especially the Latin American countries, have diﬃculty ﬂoating
because they do suﬀer from original sin as evidenced in their inability to
borrow abroad in domestic currencies. They tend to have greater ﬁnancial
depth when they have ﬁxed rates. For Asia, ﬂoating exchange rates are as-
sociated with one measure of greater ﬁnancial depth, but this may be be-
462 Michael D. Bordo and Marc Flandreaucause it is less ﬁnancially open. For another measure ﬁxed rates and ﬁnan-
cial depth go hand in hand, similar to the experiences of Latin America.
In conclusion, the dynamics of the international monetary system and
the evolution of the exchange rate regime can be understood as being com-
plex, involving both the ﬁnancial development of countries and interna-
tional ﬁnancial integration. Financial crises such as those in the 1890s and
the 1990s are the deﬁning moments that reveal the regime fault lines be-
tween advanced and emerging countries. The evolution from the gold stan-
dard to ﬂoating by the advanced countries required achieving ﬁnancial ma-
turity, and the same will ultimately be required for the rest of the world. In
the interim, the panoply of intermediate arrangements with varying forms
of government intervention, including impediments to the free ﬂow of cap-
ital, will prevail. Financial crises as occurred in the 1890s and the 1990s will
also continue to be an important part of the process of regime evolution as




M2. Data appendix to Bordo et al. (2001; available on request) for all
countries except the following: Austria, Komlos (1987); Chile, Bordo and
Rockoﬀ (1996); Greece, Kostelenos (1995); the Netherlands and Norway,
Bordo and Jonung (2001); Portugal, Bordo and Schwartz (1996); Russia,
Drummond (1976).
Nominal GDP, real GDP, implicit price deﬂator, and CPI. Data appendix
to Bordo et al. (2001) for all countries except the following: Austria, Kom-
los (1987); Chile, Bordo and Rockoﬀ (1996); Greece, Kostelenos (1995);
Russia, Drummond (1976).
Population. Data appendix to Bordo et al. (2001) for all countries except
the following: Austria, Crédit Lyonnais economic studies; the Netherlands,
Russia and Switzerland, Mitchell (1992).
Short-term interest rates. Argentina, data provided by Alan Taylor from
Obstfeld and Taylor (ch. 3 in this volume); Austria, The Economist; Aus-
tralia, Bordo and Rockoﬀ (1996); Belgium, Mitchell (1992); Brazil, Global
Financial Data; Canada, Bordo and Jonung (1987; we substituted long-
term interest rates for short-term interest rates); Chile, Subercaseaux
(1926); Denmark and Finland, constructed by Marc Flandreau from a va-
riety of national oﬃcial sources; France and Germany, Bordo (1993);
Greece, data provided by Olga Charodonlakis; Italy, The Economist;Japan,
Bordo; the Netherlands, Bordo and Jonung (1995); Norway, Flandreau;
Core, Periphery, Exchange Rate Regimes, and Globalization 463Portugal,  The Economist; Russia,  The Economist; Spain, Sweden, and
Switzerland, Flandreau; United Kingdom, Bordo; United States, Bordo.
Government ﬁnance (expenditures and tax receipts). Argentina and Aus-
tria, Mitchell (1992); Australia, David Pope (ANU); Belgium, Bordo and
Jonung (2001); Brazil, Mitchell (1993); Canada, Bordo and Jonung; Chile,
Mitchell (1993); Denmark, Finland, France, and Germany, Bordo and Jo-
nung; Greece, Mitchell (1992); Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, and Norway,
Bordo and Jonung; Portugal, Russia, and Spain, Mitchell (1992); Sweden,
Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and the United States, Bordo and Jo-
nung.
1973–1997
M2, nominal GDP, real GDP, population, implicit price deﬂator and CPI,
and government expenditures and tax receipts. Forty-four countries, twenty-
two advanced countries, and twenty-two emerging countries: See data ap-
pendix to Bordo et al. (2001).
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Comment Anna J. Schwartz
The question the paper is designed to answer is how to account for the
diﬀerent exchange rate regimes that countries adopted during the era of
globalization before the First World War and during the second era of glob-
alization post–Bretton Woods. The authors oﬀer three diﬀerent approaches
to answer the question: They provide correlation tests between saving and
investment panel data; they discuss ﬁnancial immaturity before 1914 in
terms of the need by capital-poor countries to include gold clauses in debt
instruments and denote the ability to borrow abroad in domestic currency
as a hallmark of gold adherence and ﬁnancial depth; and they estimate
money demand equations to test the diﬀerence in ﬁnancial depth between
capital-rich and –poor.
Let me note why I prefer a distinction between capital-rich and capital-
poor rather than core and periphery, the authors’ choice. The core-
peripheral classiﬁcation seems an apt one applied to the gold standard
world. For this paper, which concerns globalization, a better choice for clas-
sifying the two sets of countries would have been capital-rich and capital-
poor. Foreign direct investment ﬂows not only from the capital-rich to the
capital-poor, which is often discussed in globalization studies, but in the
current era increasingly from one capital-rich country to other capital-rich
countries.
The focus of the paper is on why the capital-rich countries adopted ﬁxed
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Anna J. Schwartz is adjunct professor of economics at the Graduate Center of the City Uni-
versity of New York and a research associate of the National Bureau of Economic Research.exchange rates during the ﬁrst era of globalization and, during the second
era of globalization, except for the European Union (hardly as minor an ex-
ception as the paper implies), adopted the radically opposite system of
ﬂoating exchange rates. The capital-poor countries, on the other hand, the
authors say, have been “surprisingly consistent”; they tried unsuccessfully
to adhere to the gold standard during the ﬁrst era of globalization and
ended up with currency boards, close to 100 percent gold reserves, or ﬂoat-
ing exchange rates and, in the second era, have had trouble maintaining
ﬂoating rates and have pegged to capital-rich-country currencies. The “con-
sistency” must refer to the variety of exchange rate system choices in both
eras of globalization by capital-poor countries. I doubt the reference to cur-
rency boards during the ﬁrst era. Colonial countries then had currency
boards, dictated by the imperial country. Colonial countries had no voice in
the choice.
The explanation the paper oﬀers for the diﬀerential exchange rate ar-
rangements of the two classes of countries in the two eras hinges on the
attainment of ﬁnancial maturity. Financial maturity encompasses the de-
velopment of wide and deep ﬁnancial markets and sound ﬁscal and mone-
tary arrangements. For the capital-rich countries, reaching that nirvana al-
lowed them to ﬂoat in the second era. I do not accept this explanation for
their decision to ﬂoat post–Bretton Woods. What seems more likely is that
these countries ﬁxed their exchange rates before the First World War be-
cause that seemed the only way to avoid inﬂation, but they later learned that
ﬂoating freed monetary policy and that it was possible to avoid inﬂation if
monetary policy was conducted to that end.
The authors regard the current episode of ﬂoating as proof of ﬁnancial
maturity and the exchange rate regime to which all countries should aspire.
Barely twenty years ago, ﬂoating rates were held to be temporary arrange-
ments that would be succeeded by ﬁxed rates in the absence of shocks. It is
premature for economic historians to describe the brief experience of ﬂoat-
ing free of inﬂation since the 1990s as a durable system. History is a record
of repeated reversals between ﬁxed and ﬂoating.
Financial immaturity may be an adequate explanation for the failure of
capital-poor countries to adhere to the gold standard in the ﬁrst era. When
they then ﬂoated and devalued, they suﬀered losses imposed on them as
borrowers in the international capital market because interest payments
and principal were denominated in the currencies of capital-rich countries.
That experience clariﬁed the advantage of adopting the gold standard, but
failed monetary and ﬁscal policies undermined their adherence. Financial
immaturity may also explain why capital-poor countries that tried ﬁxing
had to shift to ﬂoating rates of exchange in the current era of globalization
and learned that ﬂoating was no panacea. Financial immaturity may be a
euphemism for misguided monetary and ﬁscal policies.
Section 9.2 uses correlation tests between saving and investment panel
Core, Periphery, Exchange Rate Regimes, and Globalization 469data to measure the degree of ﬁnancial integration. The pre-1914 subgroup
of gold standard countries did not achieve greater ﬁnancial openness than
the entire complement of countries. In the interwar years, gold standard
and sterling area countries were less ﬁnancially integrated than the entire
complement of countries. The paper attributes this result to the presence of
capital controls that reduced integration. All in all, the paper concludes that
because the pre-1914 sample with ﬁxed exchange rates and no capital con-
trols was only imperfectly integrated, the gold standard was not the reason
globalization occurred. Globalization was the reason the gold standard was
adopted. Small diﬀerences in the correlation results are the basis for this
conclusion.
For 1973–97, the paper presents saving and investment correlation esti-
mates for a sample, subgrouped into developed, total emerging, emerging
Asia, and emerging Latin American countries, classiﬁed as participating in
one of three types of exchange rate regime (ﬁxed, intermediate, or ﬂoating)
associated with higher or lower levels of integration. Asian countries are
less open than the average, Latin American countries more open. With re-
spect to alternative exchange rate regimes, developed countries are more in-
tegrated whether they ﬁx or ﬂoat, with the ﬁxers tending to be smaller coun-
tries.
The conclusion the paper reaches in section 9.2 is that European inte-
gration in the second era of globalization is a result of liberalization of ﬁ-
nancial services rather than a result of the exchange rate regime. Whether
ﬁxed or ﬂoating, capital-rich countries have implemented ﬁnancial open-
ness. Financial integration in Latin American countries, however, accord-
ing to the paper, has forced the adoption of either ﬁxed or ﬂoating rate
regimes. The authors ﬁnd that Asia has retained all three exchange rate
regimes because it has remained more ﬁnancially closed than the rest of the
world. The exchange rate regime is a product of globalization. The authors
believe that globalization has polarized the choice of exchange rate regimes
between ﬂoating and ﬁxing—a result known as hollowing out. In fact, an
exchange rate regime does not exist in a vacuum. Whatever the choice, it can
succeed only if a country’s policy decisions are sound and its institutions—
labor markets, ﬁscal arrangements, legal framework—function well.
Section 9.3 provides a discussion of exchange rate regimes, ﬁnancial
crises, and ﬁnancial maturity. The paper inquires whether exchange rate
problems today diﬀer from nineteenth-century problems, and answers no.
The capital-poor adopted the gold standard before 1914 as an insurance
mechanism against international ﬁnancial disturbances. The gold standard
for them was an endogenous response to gold clauses. For the capital-rich
which had developed strong money and ﬁnancial markets before 1914 and
could issue debt in their own currency, however, ﬂoating should have been
preferred, but they did not ﬂoat. The explanation, according to the paper, is
that the capital-rich, by using exchange rate adjustments within the gold
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have ﬁnally been able to exploit their ability to ﬂoat.
It used to be said that there was leeway under the gold standard in the
short term for monetary authorities to delay adjustment. However, the lee-
way is explained diﬀerently by the authors, who describe it in terms of the
ﬂuctuation bands between the gold export point and the gold import point,
within which bands monetary authorities could buﬀer transitory shocks.
The gold standard bands thus served as a conceptual target zone. On this
view, there is less of a diﬀerence between the degree of ﬂexibility of the pre-
1914 gold standard and the post–Bretton Woods ﬂoating rate that capital-
rich countries have favored. In any event, although I believe that there was
a degree of short-term ﬂexibility under the gold standard, it was far from
the ﬂexibility of a ﬂoat. The paper makes too much of this supposed simi-
larity. Moreover, there is no justiﬁcation for the authors’ belief that there
should be such a similarity.
Capital-poor countries had trouble pegging before 1914 because of cur-
rent account and terms-of-trade shocks, and were especially vulnerable to
world deﬂation during 1873–96. Adopting gold did not immediately win
them credibility and lower short-term interest rates. Their interest rates
were persistently higher before 1914 than discount rates of the capital-rich
countries. Pegging was a problem for the capital-poor during both the ﬁrst
and second globalization eras. If ﬁxing posed problems before 1914 for the
capital-poor, and ﬂoating did the same in the current era, one common rea-
son was that they borrowed from the capital-rich in the latter’s currencies.
Early on, the capital-poor had to issue securities with a ﬁxed exchange rate
clause that tied the coupon to the currency of the market where they were
sold. When the gold standard became widespread, this practice became
gold clauses. Exchange risk was assumed by capital-poor issuers, whether
governments or corporations. Mere linking of the local currency to gold
was not enough to enable a country to issue obligations in its own currency.
Only a narrow list of countries could issue debt in their own currency.
The paper argues that before 1914 this condition prevented the capital-
poor from developing well-organized domestic ﬁnancial markets. They
could not attract foreign bank deposits, but were dependent on bank loans
from merchant banks in capital-rich countries that were denominated in the
currencies of the capital-rich. For this reason the capital-poor countries
were vulnerable to ﬁnancial crises. If their spending increased, the share of
debt denominated in gold rose in relation to the debt-GDP ratio. The mis-
match between the currency in which debt was denominated and the local
currency aggravated the debt burden when the local currency depreciated.
This explanation of ﬁnancial crises before and since 1914 provides a les-
son that the capital-poor countries should learn. The paper refers to the re-
sponse of Spain and Portugal that ﬂoated but minimized their exposure by
avoiding borrowing abroad.
Core, Periphery, Exchange Rate Regimes, and Globalization 471In section 9.4, the paper compares the eﬀects of alternative exchange rate
regimes in 1880–1914 and 1973–97 on ﬁnancial depth, proxied by the ratio
of broad money to GDP.
The paper concludes that the key diﬀerence between capital-rich and
capital-poor countries is that the former enjoy ﬁnancial maturity, mani-
fested in open and domestic ﬁnancial markets, stable money, and ﬁscal pro-
bity. The capital-rich can issue debt denominated in domestic currency.
Countries that are ﬁnancially mature in a world of open capital markets
should be able to ﬂoat as do capital-rich countries.
I ask the authors: If you believe that globalization isn’t conditional on any
particular exchange rate regime, and it was feasible before 1914 with a pre-
dominantly gold standard, and has been feasible since the mid-1970s with
a predominantly ﬂoating rate regime, why are you so eager to portray the
gold standard as really not so diﬀerent from a ﬂoating rate regime?
Also, you claim that we will know that the capital-poor are ﬁnancially
mature when they successfully adopt ﬂoating. I believe that we will know
that they are ﬁnancially mature when they adopt sound monetary and ﬁs-
cal policies with the appropriate institutional infrastructure. Whatever ex-
change rate ﬁnancially mature capital-poor countries adopt will then work
well.
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